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ABSTRACT This article points out the limits of Austrian economics as far as the passage
from positive to normative economics is concerned. We propose a comparison with
neoclassical economics and discuss the different theoretical solutions adopted by these
two schools of thought in their legitimization of the normative discourse. The bridge
from positive to normative economics is analyzed as resting upon two interdependent
pillars, one of a technical nature, the other of an ethical one. In neoclassical theory,
these two pillars are, respectively, the Pareto principle and the so-called minimal
benevolence principle. In the case of Austrian economics, they are the coordination
principle and a set of value judgments considered to be ‘quasi-universal’. One problem
for Austrian economics is that the coordination principle turns out to be incompatible
with process analysis, the latter being a central tenet of the Austrian theory. A second
problem, which creates serious difficulties for both schools, has to do with distribution.
Our thesis is that whereas the neoclassical solution of the distributive problem is
formally consistent (although deeply unrealistic), the Austrian solution is theoretically
untenable and based on strong, although implicit, value judgments.
1. Introduction
The intrusion of value judgments into economic analysis can take place at different
levels. As Myrdal (1969) has pointed out, value judgments necessarily come into
play at the decisive step of the choice of the problem to investigate. At this level,
the only thing to do in the attempt to separate ideological statements from scien-
tific investigation is to explicitly state, right from the beginning, the motivations
and reasons that underlie the choice of the field of investigation and the particular
definition of the problem adopted. At a subsequent stage, when the aim is to define
a body of normative economics to appraise the different policies of a capitalist
state, stronger value judgments are implicitly introduced, since capitalism as a
system is taken as given: one of these value statements is that remuneration
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should depend on performance. That remuneration depends on performance is a
fact in capitalism (a fact that is not necessarily consistent with the marginalist
theory of income distribution based on productivity, but that perhaps depends
more on institutional factors and power relations), and the value judgment in ques-
tion is simply the moral approval of it (Harsanyi, 1976). Finally, the approaches
that build their positive frameworks on the assumptions of methodological indivi-
dualism (which is the case of both Austrian and neoclassical economics) often also
espouse some form of ideological individualism when passing to normative analy-
sis: it is one thing to say that economic processes and states of affairs must be
explained starting from the individual, and another thing to say that the individual
is the best judge of his own wellbeing. The former is a methodological position,
the latter an ideological one (Blaug, 1980).
In this paper, we do not focus on these levels of intrusion of value judgments
in economics. Instead, with Myrdal, we concede that there is an inescapable a
priori element in all scientific work; and, since we are interested in the legitimacy
of different normative positions within capitalism and not in the moral legitimacy
of capitalism, we also accept, for the sake of argument, the ethical principle
that remuneration should depend on performance.1 Finally, although with
greater reservation, we accept the ideological individualism that characterizes
both Austrian and neoclassical economics.
Even with these concessions, however, we claim that the passage from posi-
tive to normative analysis is still problematic for Austrian economics. To demon-
strate this, we propose a comparison with neoclassical economics, and discuss the
different theoretical solutions adopted by these two schools of thought in their
attempt to legitimize their normative discourse.
The positive question examined consists of the determination of the mechan-
isms of the working of the market. The normative question that flows from it con-
sists of appraising the desirability of such mechanisms. The passage from positive
to normative claims obviously implies the introduction of value judgments, even
leaving aside the three levels of ideological intrusion mentioned above. The scien-
tific problem is thus one of minimizing these value judgments by leaning as much
as possible on an efficiency criterion, which is presumably neutral from the view-
point of values. The bridge between positive and normative analysis rests in this
way upon two interdependent pillars, one of a technical nature (the efficiency cri-
terion), the other of an ethical nature (a set of value judgments) (see Table 1). From
a methodological viewpoint, the normative discourse is legitimate in the same
degree as the role of the first pillar is important and that of the second one is weak.
Unlike neoclassical economics, Austrian economics does not constitute
a unified paradigm. Before proceeding, it is therefore necessary to identify the
basic features of the Austrian tradition and the authors to whom we shall refer.
Notwithstanding the differences among Austrian economists, for the purposes of
this paper, we may adopt the following characterization: Austrians do not
adhere to the formalist program endorsed by neoclassicals, which in general
1See Palermo (2004) for a critical discussion of the ethics of capitalism and the mystified represen-
tations of it presented by Austrians and neoclassicals.
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terms aims at determining the conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is
reached; the Austrian research program may be defined instead as an attempt to
analyze the market mechanism from a dynamic perspective, by defining compe-
tition as a disequilibrium process rather than a state of affair. 2 This distinctive
position directly flows from the specifically Austrian conception of subjectivism
(see O’Driscoll & Rizzo, 1985). The economic actor is the engine of change,
the dynamic force of the market process; the market process is the outcome of
the interaction of individual subjective plans and the theoretical problem is to
appraise the mechanism through which the market realizes an efficient coordi-
nation of these plans.3 Neoclassical economics, by contrast, starts directly from
an equilibrium configuration and examines the relationships between economic
variables that characterize such a configuration.4
To be more precise, in what follows, by Austrians we basically refer to Mises
(with his economic theory of human action), Hayek (with his knowledge-based
theory of competition) and their modern followers, that is to say Rothbard (faithful
to the praxeological logic of Mises) and Kirzner (at the junction of Mises’s prin-
ciple of human action and Hayek’s knowledge problem). We deliberately exclude
Lachmann and his followers from this definition: as argued elsewhere (Gloria-
Palermo, 1999), Lachmann may well be considered, from a historiographical
point of view, the most faithful follower of Menger, carrying the subjectivist
program to its furthest implications. However the theoretical results to which
this approach leads are extremely troublesome, since it becomes impossible to
prove that the market process is equilibrating (Lachmann, 1969, 1986). This is
perhaps why Lachmann and his followers are considered by Rothbardians and
Kirznerians to be Austrian dissenters (Gloria-Palermo, 2002).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the pillars of the neoclassi-
cal and the Austrian bridges that sustain the passage from positive to normative
analysis. A first problem for Austrian economics is that the adoption of the
Table 1. The terms of the problem
Positive analysis
Bridge
Normative analysisTechnical pillar Ethical pillar
Theory of market
interaction
Efficiency
criterion
Strictly necessary
value judgments
Desirability of
the market
2The interest in process analysis as a tenet of Austrian economics was clearly stated for the first time
by Mayer (1932), who criticized the formalist approach, or ‘functional theories’, concerned with
describing price relations in an equilibrium situation. Mayer proposed instead to focus on the
process of price formation by adopting a ‘causal-genetic’ approach.
3Beyond this general proposition, however, substantial differences remain among Austrian authors,
concerning in particular two points: (1) the characteristics of the equilibrium reference, which vary
from one author to another, and even within the work of the same author from one period to another
and (2) the theoretical role played by this equilibrium reference (cf., for instance, Vaughn, 1994).
4This is not to say that neoclassical economics is not interested in disequilibrium processes as well,
as the research on stability testifies. It means simply that welfare economics is static in its
foundations.
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coordination principle turns out to be incompatible with process analysis. This
problem is discussed in Section 3. A second problem, which creates serious
difficulties for both schools of thought, has to do with distribution. The discussion
of the distributive issue is perhaps the hardest test for ethical neutrality, since
it involves an explicit social appraisal of individual utilities and values. The
theoretical solutions offered by the two schools are presented in Section 4. Our
thesis is that, whereas neoclassical economics formally passes the test, managing
to preserve its theoretical consistency (although at a dear price on the ground of
realism), Austrian economics does not pass it, its normative prescriptions resting
upon strong, although implicit, value judgments.
2. The Bridge Between Positive and Normative Analysis
The necessity for eliminating value judgments from economic theory is an old idea
whose origin goes back to Hume’s postulate that it is not scientifically legitimate
to deduce what ought to be from what is. Facts and values should be rigorously
separated; science should concentrate on facts and be value-free, whereas value
judgments should enter the domain of art, which focuses on what should be.
This idea has been advocated in economics through the distinction between
positive economics, which should be value-free, and normative economics in
which value judgments should be made explicit. The persistence of this position
during the 20th century finds its greatest systematization in the doctrine of
Wertfreiheit (value-freedom) developed by Max Weber. According to Weber,
the social scientist should remain value-free and, parallel to this, the moral scien-
tist should develop a coherent discourse on ethical values (Wertungsdiskussionen).
The neoclassical response to the problem of value judgments was the devel-
opment, in the 1930s, of the so-called new welfare economics, based on the effi-
ciency principle of Pareto and the ethical principle of ‘minimal benevolence’ (see
Table 2). Austrian economics has remained attached to the Humean guillotine by
proposing, for its part, the ‘coordination principle’ and what are often called
‘quasi-universal value judgments’ as technical and ethical pillars of its bridge to
normative analysis (see Table 3).
2.1. Pareto Principle and Minimal Benevolence
An influential criticism against the epistemological basis of Pigouvian welfare
economics, based on interpersonal comparisons, was raised by Robbins (1932),
Table 2. The neoclassical solution
Positive analysis
Bridge
Normative analysisTechnical pillar Ethical pillar
Competitive
equilibrium theory
Pareto criterion Minimal benevolence Desirability of
competitive equilibrium
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who defended the objectivity of economic analysis by proposing to exclude from
economics not only value judgments, but also the discussion of value judgments.
The idea that Paretian welfare economics is value-free was then defended by
Archibald (1959) and Hennipman (1976), who argued that Paretian welfare econ-
omics simply studies the effectiveness of alternative configurations, by comparing
the utilities of each individual taken separately (cf. Blaug, 1980, ch. 5). No value
judgment is required to establish a comparison according to the Pareto principle.
Value judgments enter only at the crucial step of normative prescription. To put it
differently, to say that B is Pareto superior to A involves no value judgment; to
prescribe B when A and B are both feasible necessarily involves value judgments.
But if prescriptions are left aside, the propositions of Paretian welfare economics
are susceptible to empirical testing like any other positive proposition. In this
sense, according to Archibald, welfare theorems must themselves be considered
theorems of positive economics.5 If, however, prescriptions are to be derived
from these positive statements, then value judgments must be introduced in one
form or another: what is needed is, in fact, a simple value judgment according
to which it is desirable to eliminate the inefficiency stemming from the existence
of a potential Pareto improvement. Such a value judgment flows from the appar-
ently innocuous moral principle of ‘minimal benevolence’: other things being
equal, it is a morally good thing if people are better off. 6
This principle, according to the neoclassicals, contains the minimal ethical
position necessary to translate the positive statements of the new welfare econ-
omics into normative propositions. With the acceptance of minimal benevolence,
Pareto improvements are also moral improvements and Pareto efficiency is
morally desirable.7
Table 3. The Austrian solution
Positive analysis
Bridge
Normative analysisTechnical pillar Ethical pillar
Market process
theory
Coordination
criterion
Quasi-universal
value judgments
Desirability of the
market process
5This is not entirely true in the sense of Myrdal. Why should one be interested in Pareto efficiency if
not for normative purposes? On closer analysis, the perfect competition model itself can hardly be
considered a useful tool from a purely positive viewpoint, if one thinks of its highly unrealistic
assumptions of perfect information and complete markets. If this model makes any sense, it is
only as a response to a normative question.
6For a critical discussion on the role of minimal benevolence in the passage from positive to norma-
tive economics, see Hausman & McPherson (1996, ch. 4).
7In light of the limited applicability of the Pareto criterion, neoclassical economics has developed
along two alternative paths: (1) the definition of a social welfare function, which explicitly introduces
value judgments and is, among other things, subject to the Arrow’s impossibility theorem if one tries to
build it as an aggregation of individual preferences (Bergson, 1938; Samuelson, 1947; Arrow, 1951);
and (2) the elaboration of compensation criteria a` laKaldor and Hicks, which, however, may be subject
to theoretical paradoxes (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1940; Scitovsky, 1941; Little, 1950; Samuelson, 1950).
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2.2. Coordination Principle and Quasi-Universal Value Judgments
Despite the tendency of the normative discourse to favor the free market, an Aus-
trian welfare economics can hardly be said to exist (Cowen, 1991, 1994). It is,
however, possible to identify some common features among Austrian authors,
in particular their reliance upon the principle of coordination as efficiency criterion
(if this principle is understood in a very general sense) and their reliance upon a set
of value judgments derived from classical liberalism.
Mises (1949) characterizes the Austrian position as a formal ‘praxeological
system’. Praxeology is ‘the general theory of human action’ (Mises, 1949, p. 3).
It concerns the set of implications logically deduced from the sole axiom of
human action, according to which action is purposeful. The whole set of praxeo-
logical sciences is built upon this subjectivist dimension, according to which
human choice must be distinguished from passive response to the environment.
Praxeological propositions are made up of universally valid statements, comple-
tely independent of the personal values of the scientist, for individuals’ goals
and means are not the object of investigation. Economics is a component of prax-
eology that focuses on a particular type of human action: market interactions.
According to praxeology, the criterion used to appraise the efficiency of an
economic configuration should meet two requirements, namely subjectivism and
value freedom. An economic system is efficient insofar as it allows individuals
to follow their subjective plans. Accordingly, an efficient situation is one in
which individual plans are fully compatible, namely, a situation of coordination.8
As Rothbard (1956, 1976) underscores, praxeology (and thus economics) is
not sufficient by itself to enable the theorist to make any normative statement.
The passage to policy pronouncements requires the prior establishment of an
explicit ethics, as Mises (1949, pp. 153–154) makes clear:
Liberalism (i.e. laissez-faire liberalism) is a political doctrine. [. . .] As a politi-
cal doctrine liberalism (in contrast to economic science) is not neutral with
regard to values and ultimate ends sought by action. [. . .] The champions of
liberal doctrines are fully aware of the fact that their teachings are valid only
for people who are committed to their ethical principles. While praxeology,
and therefore economics too, uses the terms happiness and removal of uneasi-
ness in a purely formal sense, liberalism attaches to them a concrete meaning.
It presupposes that people prefer life to death, health to sickness, nourishment
to starvation, abundance to poverty. It teaches man how to act in accordance
with these valuations.
According to Rothbard, Mises introduced the minimal possible degree of
value judgment in his application of the results of praxeology to politics: ‘his
value judgment is the desirability of fulfilling the subjectively desired goals of
the bulk of the populace’ (Rothbard, 1976, p. 105). This statement plays the
8On closer scrutiny, the praxeologically-based defense of the free market turns out to be built on a
tautology: if the unhampered market is defined as a system in which people interact peacefully,
without violence, through voluntary agreements (Rothbard, 1962) and if voluntarism is considered
ethically good because it enables individuals to fulfill their goals whatever they be (Mises’s minimal
value judgment), then, by definition, the unhampered market is desirable.
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same role as the minimal benevolence principle in the neoclassical framework. It
simply means that it is desirable that people can act according to their will. This is
nothing other than the classical liberal doctrine that morally supports the values of
liberty, of individual sovereignty and promotes the voluntarism of choices. These
values are presented as being so innocuous that almost nobody would question
them and are in this sense said to be ‘quasi-universal’.9
Although they discard the praxeological framework, Kirzner and Hayek
reach similar results. In line with Austrian subjectivism, these authors replace
the Pareto principle with the coordination criterion, which strictly respects ‘the
individuality of individual purposes’ (Kirzner, 1976, p. 85). The notion of coordi-
nation is understood simply as the fulfillment of the unaggregated preference
structure of the individuals and refers to a situation in which there is full compat-
ibility among individual plans.10 What is the set of value judgments associated
with this efficiency criterion? According to Kirzner and Hayek, what is good is
the efficiency criterion itself, or, in other words, coordination is good per se.
This ethical position is very close to the neoclassical minimal benevolence prin-
ciple: it is a morally good thing if people realize their subjective plans of action.
At a strict positive level, Hayek and Kirzner analyze the market process as a
procedure that is more efficient than alternative arrangements in discovering and
disseminating new knowledge that can be used by all the members of the system to
modify their plans toward a better fulfillment of their respective ends (Hayek,
1978, p. 180; Kirzner, 1992, p. 60). To put it differently, competition is successful
in disseminating new knowledge and leads to increasing degrees of coordination.
According to Kirzner and Hayek, this positive result provides scientific support to
those who promote a society of unhampered markets as soon as one espouses the
liberal doctrine that underpins the values of individual sovereignty and voluntar-
ism of action (Kirzner, 1976; Hayek, 1979).11
To recap, all modern Austrians examined here accept the replacement of the
Pareto criterion with the coordination principle if this principle is understood in a
very general sense as the fulfillment of individual plans. The associated ethics
is made up of a set of value judgments derived from the liberal doctrine and
presented as arousing quasi-unanimous consent. The combination of these two
9Blaug’s comment on this characterization of value judgments is straightforward: ‘This is a silly
characterization of value-judgments for, by definition, value judgments are ethical prescriptions
that are much debated!’ (Blaug 1980, ch. 5).
10Kirzner (1987, p. 11) affirms that ‘modern Austrians have converged on the notion of coordination
as the key to normative discussion’. This concept can already be found in Hayek’s (1937) ‘Econ-
omics and knowledge’ and is made explicit in particular in Kirzner (1973).
11The difference however between Mises and Rothbard, on the one hand, and Hayek and Kirzner, on
the other, is that praxeology maintains that by definition when a person acts, his ex ante utility
increases (Rothbard, 1976, p. 98). In other words, for Mises and Rothbard the very fact of being
engaged in a transaction means that a more coordinated situation is expected by the participants.
This expectation however does not guaranty that coordination will actually increase, putting some
doubt on the coherence of their pro-market normative stance. Hayek and Kirzner on the contrary
make the case for the free market on the basis of the positive results of their theories of convergence
of the market process, by using the knowledge problem to articulate the idea of convergence toward
coordination.
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pillars is the ultimate theoretical support of the Austrian normative defense of the
free market.
3. The Coordination Principle and Disequilibrium Analysis
The problem of convergence of the market process concerns the effects of market
interactions on the compatibility of individual plans: the market process is said to
be convergent if it generates processes of revision of individual plans that lead pro-
gressively to the elimination of all (eventual) incompatibilities. For the market
process to converge, it is necessary that (1) by interacting in the market, individ-
uals modify their plans according to the signals provided by market interactions;
and (2) such signals be sufficient to lead individuals to formulate increasingly
compatible plans.
Hayek and Kirzner analyze the process of convergence by focusing on the
effects of market interactions on individual knowledge. Their idea is that
market interactions spread knowledge among individuals leading them to
modify their plans towards higher and higher degrees of compatibility. According
to Hayek (1945, 1949, 1978), knowledge is time and place specific, and the poten-
tiality of the market process lies in the possibilities it creates for the exploitation,
as opposed to the elimination, of such specificities. Indeed, the convergence of the
market process does not imply at all that individuals end up with a common
knowledge; on the contrary, it is their different knowledge that allows them to for-
mulate plans that, in the course of the market process, become more and more
compatible. The process of convergence is specified in more details in Kirzner’s
theory of entrepreneurship (Kirzner, 1973), where the alertness of individuals
(of entrepreneurs in particular) assures the convergence of the market process:
alert entrepreneurs perceive the existing profit opportunities and by exploiting
them, progressively eliminate all the manifestations of disequilibrium.
The objective here is not to criticize the explanatory power of the Austrian
theory of the market process.12 Let us proceed instead as if this theory were ana-
lytically satisfactory and let us focus on the relation between the theory of conver-
gence and the use of the principle of coordination as a technical pillar of the bridge
to normative analysis.
Remember that in the Austrian framework, the market process is, by defi-
nition, a process in which individuals do not realize their plans. Indeed, the analy-
sis is coherent only to the extent that equilibrium (or full coordination) is not
reached, otherwise there would be no market process: if plans became compatible
during the market process, the process itself would end. The market process is
instead characterized by continuous unexpected change, which prevents full
coordination from being attained. But now, if the positive framework is developed
to analyze the process, the normative evaluation too should refer to the process
and not to a hypothetical (never reached) final state.
The contradiction is therefore straightforward: on the one hand, the Austrian
theory rests on the necessary assumption that individuals act in a situation of
12Criticisms of this sort are developed by Cowen & Fink (1985) and Ioannides (1992), who direct
their arguments at Mises’s and Hayek’s theories respectively.
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dis-coordination, but, on the other hand, the market is considered efficient (and
desirable). However, if the normative criterion is coordination, how can one
argue for the desirability of a system that, by assumption, is dis-coordinated?
From an analytical viewpoint, this contradiction is the result of the assump-
tion of a dynamic positive framework and of an efficiency principle for normative
analysis that resembles too much the static concept of equilibrium. As a matter of
fact, if coordination might ever be reached, i.e. if plans might effectively become
fully compatible, the concept of coordination would coincide with that of equili-
brium. On the other hand, if the concept of coordination is defined in such a way as
to allow some forms of plan incompatibilities, then it can no longer be accepted as
a pure efficiency pillar of the bridge to normative analysis.
The hypothesis that full coordination is never reached considerably under-
mines the internal consistency of the coordination principle as a technical pillar
of the bridge between positive and normative analysis, and casts doubts on the Aus-
trian defense of the free market. Rigorously speaking, the Austrian theory implies a
negative evaluation of the free market system: if the market process is presumed to
work as the Austrian theory represents it, and its efficiency is to be appraised
according to the coordination principle, then the free market system is inefficient
(and, thus, according to Austrian quasi-universal value judgments, undesirable).
A way out of this dilemma might be to adopt a soft interpretation of the Aus-
trian theory: one might argue that, among all institutional systems, the free market
is perhaps the least bad. But is it possible to make such an institutional comparison
within the Austrian framework? As argued above, the coordination principle is
inadequate, since it is inconsistent with one of the methodological tenets of the
Austrian theory (in the Austrian dynamic framework, individuals, at least partly,
do not realize their plans). The only way out would be to measure the degree of
dis-coordination in order to compare different systems from the viewpoint of
their relative ability to make individual plans compatible. Then what the Austrians
would have to prove is that the unhampered market process produces less dis-
coordination than other forms of social and economic organization (planning for
instance). Such a project, however, raises two problems: (1) the problem of
identifying the agents whose plans can remain unfulfilled without undermining
the overall desirability of the system (or, symmetrically, identifying the agents
whose plans must be fulfilled in order that the system be considered desirable);
(2) the problem of determining a critical measure of plan inconsistency marking
the formal passage from coordination to dis-coordination. These problems
however cannot be handled without introducing (1) a criterion for interpersonal
comparisons, and (2) value judgments about the content of individual plans that
are necessarily stronger than the uncontroversial quasi-universal values. All this
would put a weight on the bridge between positive and normative analysis that
the coordination principle and the quasi-universal value judgments cannot sustain.
4. The Problem of Distribution
One of the fields of normative analysis in which ethical positions can hardly be left
aside is the discussion of distribution. In capitalism, production and distribution
are two interdependent processes. Private ownership of the means of production
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implies that economic agents can claim a reward for the services of their
productive factors. Participation in the production process is thus itself based on
the conditions that regulate the distribution of the product. Special cases apart,
interventions in the sphere of production have distributive effects, and interven-
tions in the sphere of distribution have effects on production, so that production
and distribution cannot, in general, be analyzed separately.
At an intuitive level, the interdependence of production and distribution may
create problems as far as value-neutrality is concerned, since even apparently tech-
nical issues, such as the determination of the conditions for efficient production,
have distributive implications. This means that even normative prescriptions at
the production level might not be neutral in terms of distributive justice.
Neoclassical and Austrian economics offer different solutions to this
problem: neoclassical economics has managed to determine the conditions
under which production and distribution can be analytically separated, and in
this way, has found a formal solution to the problem of value judgments. The neo-
classical solution however is obtained at a dear price in terms of realism. Austrian
economics, on the contrary, has developed a theory based precisely on the inter-
dependence between production and distribution; this approach, however, surrep-
titiously introduces value judgments.
4.1. Production and Distribution in the General Equilibrium Model
In the general equilibrium model, production and distribution are interdependent:
given technology, individual endowments and preferences, the equilibrium con-
figuration simultaneously determines both production and distribution. The fact
that production and distribution are determined simultaneously might create
ethical problems if the production solution (which, under opportune conditions,
is Pareto efficient) were not also ethically acceptable. However, thanks to the
two fundamental welfare theorems, neoclassical economics can formally separate
the questions of production and distribution. Let us see how.
These two theorems state that (1) general equilibrium is Pareto efficient and
(2) every Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as a solution of a general equi-
librium model.
If the minimal benevolence principle is accepted, these theorems have direct
normative implications. The first theorem implies that, other things being equal,
perfectly competitive equilibria are morally desirable and market imperfections
that interfere with their achievement are morally undesirable;13 among the ‘other
things that must be equal’ in order to translate the Pareto principle into a moral prin-
ciple, there are, however, things that are more ethically controversial than minimal
benevolence, like justice and, more specifically, distributive justice: a Pareto
improvement that leads to distributive injustice might be morally undesirable.
Here, however, the second welfare theorem enters the scene: all moral concerns
about distributive justice can be solved by adjusting initial endowments (by
means of lump-sum taxes/transfers) and letting perfect competition do the rest.
13Of course, given the unrealism of the general equilibrium model, this theoretical defense of perfect
competition is not necessarily also a defense of real markets.
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These theorems constitute a powerful apolitical shield against potential
ethical attacks. There exist two separated problems, the production of a big pie
and the distribution of the pie. The second fundamental welfare theorem states
that for each ethical judgment about the criterion for the distribution of the pie,
the market mechanism leads to the attainment of the largest possible pie. If
we are not satisfied with the existing distribution, the neoclassical economist
argues, let us change it, but, after that, it would be irrational (and immoral) to
be satisfied with a pie which is not the largest one possible. Therefore, although
production and distribution are interdependent processes, the two fundamental
theorems of welfare allow us to analyze them separately.14
It is appropriate at this point to draw attention to some conditions that are
necessary for the two welfare theorems to hold. There must be: (1) no increasing
returns to scale, (2) no externalities and (3) no public goods. Notwithstanding the
lack of realism of these conditions (the problem is not simply that there exist
markets which do not respect these conditions, but rather that there is practically
no market in which the three conditions hold), neoclassical economics formally
solves the problem of distribution.15
Some skepticism should also be directed at the supposed value-freedom of
the approaches aiming at more realistic analyses developed as extensions of
the pure Walrasian model. Here, we refer not only to the neoclassical literature
on the second best, but also to the New Keynesian and the New Institutional econ-
omics, in which imperfect information, bounded rationality or some other imper-
fection prevents Pareto efficiency from being obtained in the Walrasian
framework. In these conditions, the prescription of Pareto improvement cannot
be considered neutral because its distributive implications have to be taken as
they come. If we do not like a particular distributive arrangement, the argument
‘let us change it, but, after that, it would be irrational (and immoral) to be satisfied
with a pie which is not the largest one possible’ no longer works. In this case,
there is thus a theoretical contradiction: on the one hand, the theoretical
context is a complex one in which the two welfare theorems do not hold; on
the other hand, however, Pareto efficiency is still used as a criterion for normative
prescriptions.
To recap, the passage from the positive interpretation of Paretian welfare
economics to the normative one is based on the acceptance of a relatively weak
value judgment (the minimal benevolence principle). This implies that Paretian
14One manifestation of the possibility of separating production and distribution can be found in the
so-called Coase theorem – formulated by Stigler (1989), who drew on the work of Coase (1960) –
which asserts that the initial distribution of private property rights does not influence the production
configuration of the system. Notice however that Coase himself, in his 1960 article, insists upon the
paradoxical character of such a result, which depends on the highly unrealistic assumption of the
absence of transaction costs.
15It should also be recalled that the comparative static method presupposes not only the existence of
an equilibrium, but also its uniqueness. Moreover, in order for the model to serve as a normative
guide for intervening in real markets, equilibrium should also be stable. Unfortunately, as Son-
nenschein (1973) has shown, multiple and unstable equilibria are perfectly compatible with the
assumptions of the Arrow–Debreu model. For a critical evaluation of the theoretical results
within the general equilibrium framework, see Guerrien (1985).
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welfare economics cannot be considered rigorously value-free. However, by
restricting its operational relevance to a context in which the two welfare theorems
hold, neoclassical economics can go much further on the normative ground, over-
coming one of the main problems of welfare economics: the problem of distri-
bution.16
4.2. Production and Distribution in the Austrian Theory
The interdependence of the processes of production and distribution is at the core
of Austrian normative economics. Let us examine the main contributions of Mises
and Hayek on this issue.
In line with the coordination principle, Mises defines the efficiency of an
economic system as depending on the possibility for individuals to pursue their
goals freely in the spheres of consumption and production. Individual sovereignty
is thus not limited to consumers, but is extended to the whole set of economic
agents. Consumers’ ability to achieve their goals depends on the ability of produ-
cers to offer the appropriate goods. Efficient entrepreneurs are those who best
anticipate the wishes of consumers and find the best means to realize them. In
this way, the efficiency of the overall system amounts to the efficiency of pro-
duction. The efficiency of production, in turn, is the result of a process of compe-
tition among entrepreneurs motivated by the prospect of making profits:
The more successfully [the entrepreneur] speculates the more the means of pro-
duction are at his disposal, the greater becomes his influence on the business of
society. The less successfully he speculates the smaller becomes his property,
the less becomes his influence on business. If he loses everything by speculation
he disappears from the ranks of those who are called to the direction of econ-
omic affairs. (Mises, 1936, p. 206)
Contrary to the neoclassical position synthesized in the welfare theorems,
Mises rejects any kind of redistribution, i.e. any distribution different from that
which directly flows from the production process. The production process, in its
(supposed) efficient working, determines income distribution too. Efficient pro-
duction is an indisputable social objective, which implies that its consequences
in the sphere of distribution must be accepted as they come. In this way, the Wert-
freiheit principle assumes a very particular form inMisesian comparative analysis:
it leads to the neglect of any autonomous relevance of the distributive issue.17
16If the first and second welfare theorems provide a solution to the problem of analytically separating
production and distribution, the impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) affirms that there is no logi-
cally infallible way to aggregate the preferences of diverse individuals and there is thus no logically
infallible way to solve the problem of distribution by means of democratic voting. This result (known
also as the third welfare theorem) qualifies the message of the first two welfare theorems about the
supposed desirability of laissez-faire in capitalist democracies: it is true that the market mechanism
does not raise distributive problems if the two welfare theorems hold, but it is also true that because
of the third theorem, such a mechanism is incompatible with the principles of democracy.
17Rothbard (1956, p. 251) puts it as follows: ‘There is no distributional process apart from the pro-
duction and exchange processes of the market; hence the very concept of “distribution” becomes
meaningless in the free market’.
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According to Hayek, the efficiency of an economic system depends on the sol-
ution it can offer to two general problems: the problem of incentives and the problem
of knowledge. These problems are strictly interrelated. An efficient economic
system should display a mechanism that allows individuals to discover the most rel-
evant bits of knowledge, and an efficient incentive device should ensure that scarce
resources be allocated to the most competent agents with respect to their skill in
discovering, diffusing and using the relevant specific knowledge. According to
Hayek, the market process, if not hampered, automatically transfers resources
from less competent individuals (with respect to their contribution to the knowledge
problem) to more competent ones, efficiently solving in this way the knowledge
problem. This result is based on the twofold assumption of non-appropriability of
knowledge and appropriability of profits: as soon as new knowledge becomes avail-
able, the whole society may enjoy its beneficial effects in terms of social coordi-
nation, but the discoverer alone enjoys its beneficial effects in terms of profits.
Market incentives are efficient only if there are no obstacles to the appropria-
tion of profits. In Hayek’s theory, the economic objective of society can be defined
as the production of a big pie (or, rather, the discovery of a big pie) and, conse-
quently, scarce resources should be allocated according to the contribution of
each person (in terms of knowledge discovery) to the production of the pie.
Kirzner (1989, p. 8) summarizes the Austrian position as follows:
The market system is seen in this discussion as not only producing a social ‘pie’,
but at the same time slicing up that pie and assigning the respective slices to the
specific individuals who participate in the market process. [. . .] In fact the size
and composition of the pie are as much dependent upon the pattern of income
‘distribution’ as the latter depends on the size and composition of the pie.
Unlike the neoclassical case, redistribution is considered, by definition, scien-
tifically illegitimate.18 Although both neoclassical and Austrian economics accept
the general principle that remuneration should depend on performance, the latter
pushes the principle further, putting even the notion of redistribution out of any
ethical inquiry. The fact that the only tolerated social objective is efficient
production in a context in which distribution is just a by-product of production
allows clarification of the Austrian position with respect to the distributive
issue: Austrian economics does not really neglect the distributive problem, it
simply approves the free market solution and denies the legitimacy of any redis-
tributive intervention.
5. Conclusion
In as much as the Pareto principle and the coordination principle can be applied
without the need to make interpersonal comparisons, some of their proponents
have maintained that they are value-free. This position is, however, untenable.
18According to Hayek (1976), social justice is a harmful concept. For Hayek, it basically means one
thing: the protection of particular groups in the sense ofmaintaining or increasing theirmaterial position.
Any intervention of this kind leads to the destruction of the foundations of the market order, i.e. to be
more precise, to the destruction of the incentives of each person to discover what is of value to others.
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At a general level, both neoclassical and Austrian economics rest on value
judgments, not least because the principles that remuneration should depend on
performance and that the individual is the best judge of his own wellbeing are
themselves value judgments. These general principles, however, are still insuffi-
cient to allow neoclassical and Austrian economics to build a legitimate normative
theory.
In the attempt to introduce only the value judgments that are strictly necess-
ary to support a normative position, the neoclassicals and the Austrians have intro-
duced, respectively the minimal benevolence principle and the quasi-universal
value judgments. Even with these explicit ethical positions, however, the norma-
tive discourse remains largely unfounded in both the approaches, although for
different reasons (see Table 4). In the case of neoclassical economics the main
problem is one of realism. In the case of Austrian economics it is one of internal
consistency.
In order to point out these problems we have considered the ways in which
the two approaches discuss the distributive issue, which constitutes the field in
which the value judgment problem takes its starkest form.
In capitalism, production and distribution are interdependent processes. In
principle, this interdependency is sufficient to create problems for the economist
in his attempt to provide an objective normative criterion at the level of production
(because this interdependency implies the acceptance of the distributional conse-
quences of production). To overcome this problem, neoclassical economics has
determined the conditions under which production and distribution can be ana-
lyzed separately and, in doing so, has confined its applicability to an abstract
world that has little in common with the real one (in which production and
distribution continue to be interdependent). What is scientifically questionable,
however, is that having affirmed the legitimacy of the Pareto principle in the par-
ticular abstract world in which the two welfare theorems hold, neoclassical econ-
omists have then pretended that the Pareto principle can also be applied to the real
world.
Austrian economics, on the contrary, has accepted the theoretical challenge
by building its theory precisely on the interdependence of production and distri-
bution. But it failed to meet the challenge because its position on distribution
cannot be coherently defended simply on the basis of the weak quasi-universal
value judgments. The ethical pillar has thus proved unable to support the Austrian
Table 4. Results
Positive analysis and the
technical pillar
Normative analysis and the
ethical pillar
Austrians Inconsistency between
disequilibrium analysis and
the coordination criterion
Surreptitious introduction of
additional value judgments in
the analysis of distribution
Neoclassicals Consistency between
equilibrium analysis and
Pareto efficiency
Coherent but unrealistic
analysis of the distributive
issue
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normative position in favor of the free market, and the result is a normative frame-
work in which strong value judgments are indeed present, although awkwardly
hidden.
However, the consequences of the fragility of the other pillar are perhaps
even more disastrous for the internal consistency of the Austrian theory. The
coordination principle indeed ends up being logically inconsistent with Austrian
positive analysis, and this inconsistency even impedes the appraisal of efficiency
(which is the first step for the appraisal of desirability).
At the analytical level, what is interesting is that the Austrian normative cri-
terion, if rigorously applied, ultimately leads to opposite results with respect to the
liberal doctrine that it supports: all that can be deduced from the Austrian theory is
a negative evaluation of free competition. Moreover, any attempt to go beyond this
negative result requires the introduction of stronger value judgments and creates
internal consistency problems for those who affirm that no such values should
be introduced.
We therefore conclude that the normative engagement of Austrian economics
in favor of the free market and laissez-faire is the result of a mix of strong ideo-
logical positions and weak theoretical elements and is ultimately untenable on
scientific grounds.
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